This paper characterizes the deposit runs that occurred in the commercial banking system during 2008 and compares them with deposit runs during the 1930s. The importance of withdrawals by large depositors is a strong source of continuity across the two eras and reflects the longstanding concentration of deposit holdings. Runs occurred during 2008 despite the presence of national deposit insurance, which does not fully cover large accounts and therefore has limited impact on the incentives of those account holders. Large depositors continue to represent a source of both market discipline and financial instability. 2
Introduction
Deposit runs at commercial banks have occurred at various points in American financial history, but economists commonly have perceived them as obsolete due to the presence of deposit insurance.
1 Nevertheless, commercial bank runs have re-emerged. 2 At a variety of institutions, depositors withdrew significant amounts of money in just days or weeks during the third quarter of 2008. Most notably, Wachovia and Washington Mutual, the fourth and sixth largest depository institutions in the country at the time, experienced heavy deposit outflows and other important liquidity pressures that led to the rapid sale of each to other institutions.
Depositors at Washington Mutual withdrew 9 percent of its deposits in just 9 days, and supervisors envisioned stress scenarios in which certain institutions could lose 1.5-2.0 percent of deposits a day. Confidential daily deposit data from individual institutions indicate that large outflows of deposits characterized about 10 to 15 percent of banks and thrifts at the most widespread points during late 2008, in the days following the failures of IndyMac on July 11, Lehman Brothers on September 15, and Washington Mutual on September 26.
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The 2008 runs were comprised to a great extent by outflows from large depositors, such as corporations with payroll or other transaction accounts. This role for large depositors is actually a fairly old-fashioned feature. Though small depositors famously lined up outside banks during the early 1930s, Krost (1938) demonstrates that outflows in that era were also to a great extent from large accounts, even disproportionately because large depositors were more capable of writing checks and storing money in non-deposit forms. The incentives of large depositors 1 For example, Mankiw (2011) states "Today, bank runs are not a major problem for the U.S. banking system or the Fed. The federal government now guarantees the safety of deposits at most banks, primarily through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)" (p. 636). Bernanke (2010) states that "…commercial banks and thrift institutions had been exposed to runs prior to the creation of deposit insurance." Solow (2013) states "Obviously, given these protections, there will be no runs on banks." 2 Whether deposit insurance has ended "banking panics" is another matter that depends on the breadth of the definition of a banking panic. One much cited definition comes from Calomoris and Gorton (1991) , who suggest that a banking panic "occurs when bank debt holders at all or many banks in the banking system suddenly demand that banks convert their debt claims (at par) to such an extent that banks suspend the convertibility of their debt into cash, or in the case of the United States, act collectively to avoid suspension of convertibility by issuing clearinghouse loan certificates." There is a case to be made that such moves were made during 2008 by depositors at "many" banks, though certainly not all. In a related matter, monetarist theories hold that there is a key distinction between bank runs that lead to a general conversion of deposits into currency, versus those that do not. However, this paper implicitly takes as given nonmonetarist theories of financial crises and credit crunches that would consider the type of bank runs recorded in 2008 as costly, even if they did not lead to a general conversion of deposits into currency.
were largely the same in 2008, despite the existence of national deposit insurance, since many large accounts are exceedingly far above deposit insurance limits, rendering insurance essentially a non factor. For example, at Washington Mutual, accounts in excess of $500 million each were reportedly responsible for one-quarter of the deposit outflows, at a time when the deposit insurance limit was $100 thousand. The importance of withdrawals by large depositors goes hand in hand with concentration of deposits in small numbers of accounts, which has been a longstanding feature of the US banking system. In 1933, the largest 0.15 percent of accounts held about 45 percent of deposits. In mid-2008, the closest comparable data show that the largest 1.5
percent of accounts at commercial banks held 53 percent of deposits, and only about one-quarter of the deposits in those accounts were covered by insurance. 4 The continued susceptibility of large uninsured accounts to outflows is a limiting factor in the ability of national deposit insurance to explain the long "quiet period" in US banking after the 1930s. In fact, public officials who designed the national insurance program in the 1930s anticipated that deposit movements by large depositors would continue. Legislators left large depositors uninsured in order to maintain some market discipline on bank managers, and also viewed large depositors as better informed and therefore not in need of the insurance protection proposed for smaller depositors. However, market discipline has tension with financial stability, as large depositors can and do create deposit runs.
My analysis comes with a few caveats. First, I focus on deposit runs as an important part of liquidity pressure in 2008, but other liquidity problems certainly existed as well, at banks and at other institutions. For example, Gorton and Metrick (2012) describe the run on the repo market and Covitz, Liang, and Suarez (2013) describe the run in the asset-backed commercial paper market. Second, my focus on the relatively low importance of deposit insurance for large depositors is not a denial that insurance likely does stabilize small deposits. It is possible that uninsured small depositors could be the source of serious deposit outflows if the FDIC did not exist; however, the concentration of deposits compels a particular focus on large depositors.
Third, large depositors are more common at larger banks, and therefore the analysis in this paper is somewhat more pertinent for thinking about those banks.
Methodologically, establishing these basic facts about deposit runs requires detailed institution-level work using a variety of unconventional data sources. This resembles the work of Shin (2009) , who reviews the September 2007 run by short-term creditors at a single institution, the British bank Northern Rock. Research that uses data at a quarterly frequency, such as Acharaya and Mora (2012) , tend to capture lower frequency deposit outflows, and cannot record outflows at banks that fail before quarter-end.
This paper relates to ideas that have been discussed in a few different economics literatures. Among the research on the Great Depression, Rockoff (2003) and Fuller (2012) both stress the importance of large interregional deposit movements during the banking crisis of 1933, and together they provide a wide array of anecdotal evidence pointing toward large corporate and interbank deposits. In contrast, research that has examined the behavior of individual depositors during runs has tended to focus on small depositors (See Ó Gráda and White (2003) , Iyer and Puri (2012) , and Brown, Guin, and Morkoetter (2013) ). There is also a longstanding literature on market discipline by depositors. Berger and Turk-Ariss (2012) provide an overview of that literature. Some of those papers investigate questions such as whether uninsured or possibly insured depositors discipline banks, and in what circumstances. Finally, this paper also relates to another literature regarding the history of national deposit insurance in the US. Several papers touch on how small and large depositors were viewed by legislators and interest groups during the formative period for national deposit insurance in the early and mid-1930s, including Golembe (1960) , Flood (1991) , Calomiris and White (1994) , White (1998), and Bradley (2000) .
Many of the ideas expressed in this paper have antecedents in those works.
Deposit outflows during 2008
2.1 Outflows at the largest institutions IndyMac's failure was further notable as it appears to have been responsible for contagion to other depository institutions, including Washington Mutual, National City, and Sovereign, listed in Table 1 , and also including some of the institutions listed in Table 2 The other institutions listed in Table 2 were all generally of the size that would be termed "community banks." Aside from the runs clustered around IndyMac, the runs are spaced out through 2008 and 2009, and were generally due to negative publicity specific to those institutions.
Importantly, for all of the deposit runs listed in Table 1 and Table 2 , the primary sources authoritatively state that the outflows were due primarily to depositors pulling their funds rather than due to banks permitting a run off of deposits, or due to restrictions on brokered deposits imposed by supervisors on faltering institutions. Restrictions on brokered deposits led to important deposit declines in many banks, but I do not include those banks in this paper. A separate discussion of these restrictions would be interesting, but for my purposes here they represent a very different type of outflow than active deposit withdrawals. indeed shows that consumer time deposits increased briskly starting in mid-summer 2008, but 10 It is customary with these data to combine savings and transaction deposits. Since some institutions sweep deposits between these two categories periodically, examining each category individually would erroneously identify deposit outflows that are netted out when combined. 11 There are two other periods in which elevated numbers of institutions experienced outflows of these deposits during 2008: late January into early February, and late April into early May. However, the figure suggests these are seasonal patterns, perhaps due to expenditures related to Christmas and taxes.
this was clearly not enough to fully offset declines in other deposits, and their effort to attract new deposits appears to have stopped by the fall.
Several factors likely contributed to this inflow of time deposits. As noted by Acharaya and Mora (2012), some troubled banks and thrifts responded to deposit outflows by raising interest rates, particularly on time deposits, and others followed suit out of competitive pressure.
These actions were well known and commented on at the time, and represented a scramble for liquidity that interrupted the general decline in deposit interest rates that had begun in late 2007.
In addition, some of the money fleeing money market mutual funds likely ended up in these depository institutions. Government actions changed the playing field as well, though. The
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), signed on October 3, 2008, established an increase in the FDIC insurance limit from $100 thousand to $250 thousand. 12 The EESA also created the authority to recapitalize banks. Both of these acts likely shored up the confidence of depositors, though the increased insurance limit likely had little impact on large depositors. Of greater importance for large depositors was the availability of unlimited insurance on certain types of transaction accounts beginning in late October at institutions participating in the FDIC program, discussed below.
The importance of uninsured deposits
At this point, it is clear that several major depository institutions experienced serious deposit outflows during 2008 and 2009, in many cases leading to the failure or merger of the institutions. These outflows occurred despite the presence of deposit insurance.
While deposit insurance gives holders of insured deposits little incentive to withdraw those deposits from a faltering institution, it does not cover all deposits. The FDIC system of deposit insurance, established in 1934, leaves some deposits uninsured. As of year-end 2007, at all FDIC insured institutions, 51 percent of deposits at were covered by FDIC insurance.
Excluding foreign deposits, which are not covered by insurance, coverage of domestic deposits was moderately higher, at 62 percent (see Figure 5 ). This left a significant amount of deposits held by those who had an incentive to withdraw from a faltering institution during 2008.
13 12 The insurance limit had been increased to $250,000 for retirement accounts a few years earlier. However, retirement account deposits constitute only about 4 percent of commercial bank deposits. 13 These numbers are taken from the FDIC's "Quarterly Banking Profiles" and cover all insured depository institutions, including both commercial banks and thrifts.
Uninsured deposits accounted for the bulk of withdrawals during the runs described in the previous section, according to reports by banks and their supervisors. For example, in the case of the July run at Washington Mutual (following IndyMac's failure), the bank lost 13 percent of its uninsured deposits, while losing only 2 percent of its insured deposits. Computed another way, about 70 percent of the outflow came from uninsured deposits. In fact, 25 percent of the outflow reportedly came just from accounts with more than $500 million each, which are enormous by the standards of deposit insurance and far above the $8,700 average account size at Washington Mutual. Large withdrawals from just a handful of such accounts can lead to large aggregate losses even if all other accounts do not change.
14 Deposits are heavily concentrated in a small number of accounts. 22 As a side note, it is interesting to observe that the creation of the Transaction Account Guarantee Program appears to have occurred under a different intellectual framework than the creation of deposit insurance in the 1930s. FDIC officials expressed reluctance in 2008 to insure savings or investment accounts, which carried nonzero rates of return, for fear of upsetting the "competitive equity" of those accounts relative to accounts at money market mutual funds. This basis for defining the extent of insurance coverage has no real precedent (of which I'm aware) in the discussion that took place during the 1930s or in the following decades. 23 Later, Grind describes WaMu officials as still concerned by the action of small insured depositors. "At least half of the customers who pulled out their money were covered up to $100,000; this defied the Break the Bank scenario that WaMu's treasury department had put together over the summer. 'We thought, by then, that people knew about deposit insurance,' said one of Mueller's coworkers. 'It turns out they still didn't.' Or they did know but didn't care." This quote is not necessarily inconsistent with the fact stated above that 70 percent of the deposits lost were uninsured, since the larger depositors likely withdrew larger amounts.
for concern, but it seems unlikely that a slightly higher insurance limit would have had strong effects.
Fundamentally, simple arithmetic compels a focus on large depositors. Of course, if small insured depositors were responsible for a larger portion of withdrawals than indicated by the sources cited above, then the stabilizing role of deposit insurance is even more limited than believed, and there are some serious questions regarding what motivated insured depositors to withdraw.
24 If large depositors were responsible for the majority of withdrawals, then the contribution of deposit insurance to financial stability is limited.
Are 2008 deposit runs different from "old-fashioned" bank runs?
In describing modern deposit runs, reporters and academics are understandably drawn to comparisons with historical runs, such as those in the early 1930s. Neither movie is of much value, in my opinion, in describing the nature of an old-fashioned bank run. The bank run in Mary Poppins is good comedy but is clearly a farce and does not capture any meaningful economic history. It's a Wonderful Life was a story about a building and loan association (the Bailey Bros. Building and Loan), rather than a commercial bank. This is significant insofar as Bill Bailey (portrayed by Jimmy Stewart) was able to stem the withdrawal requests in that movie by negotiating with investors in a way that would likely not have been available to commercial banks. This is an important plot point, too as the Bailey Bros. B&L was never forced to close due to withdrawal demands. In general, B&Ls (the predecessors of modern savings and loan associations) did not offer demand deposits at that time and were also generally not required to pay withdrawals of their share investments on This comparison with old-fashioned runs bears directly on the question of whether national deposit insurance has changed the nature of banking stability since 1934. In this section, I present evidence from a number of sources that indicate a strong degree of continuity between modern runs and old-fashioned runs, based on two facts. First, commercial bank deposits have long been concentrated in small numbers of very large accounts. Second, deposit runs at these banks during the 1930-1933 period were substantially the work of large depositors. Therefore, modern withdrawals by large depositors described in the previous section have much in common with old-fashioned runs. This continuity can be overlooked if too much attention is given to smaller depositors when considering historical episodes.
Concentration of deposits over the 20th century
This section presents data that measure deposit concentration at different points over the twentieth century. They all indicate that a long-standing and stable feature of the commercial banking system is a high concentration of deposit holdings by small fractions of accounts.
The extent of deposit insurance coverage at the beginning of 2008, with about 62 percent of domestic deposits insured, was not unusual compared to the extent of coverage since 1934 (see Figure 5 ). Initially the system covered only around 40-50 percent of deposits. This amount has changed over the years, as the nominal insurance coverage has been periodically increased by Congress after erosion in real terms by inflation. As of the latest data from December 2012, coverage was near the all-time high established during the early 1990s, due to an increase in coverage to $250,000 per account (from $100,000 in place until October, 2008) and unlimited insurance of noninterest-bearing transaction accounts, which expired after 2012.
demand. In the movie, Bill Bailey tells his investors they need to wait sixty days. The investors then threaten to go to the bank and sell their shares to Potter, the banker, at 50 cents on the dollar, leading Bailey to negotiate with them over how much they "really need." Bailey was negotiating from a point of legal strength and could have refused withdrawals at any time if cash reserves were insufficient without being forced into receivership. B&L investments were largely equity shares, many of which required monthly payments, in an arrangement of regulated thrift for small savers. B&Ls in some states offered savings deposits or instruments similar to certificates of deposits by the 1920s, but those were still not transaction accounts. Fundamentally, typical large depositors such as nonfinancial or financial corporations and wealthy individuals would have had little use for B&L accounts.
The result is that while small savers were central to the finances of B&Ls like the Bailey Bros. B&L depicted in It's a Wonderful Life, it is not clear that such an institution could ever have had true a deposit run, and therefore it is not necessarily straightforward to carry over the lessons of the movie into the commercial banking sphere, and somewhat ironic that this movie has become an iconic example of a bank run. B&Ls during the 1930s generally did not fail or close but rather froze for extended periods of time, even years, by refusing to pay out withdrawal request. Frank Capra directed another movie, American Madness, about a deposit run at a genuine commercial bank.
Data measuring deposit concentration tend to measure the percent of accounts that exceed some dollar threshold, and the percent of deposits held in such accounts. Historically, the thresholds used in such measurements range from levels equivalent to modern deposit insurance limits, to levels far above those limits.
The first data I know of on this subject date to 1918, when the regulator of nationally chartered banks (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) asked all national banks to report the number of accounts below and above $5,000 (roughly $76,000 in 2012 CPI-adjusted dollars). 26 The data showed that only 2.2 percent of the roughly 16 million accounts in the country exceeded that threshold, and that these accounts held 55 percent of all deposits.
Higher thresholds were used in a number of other studies periodically conducted from 1933 to 1983. The thresholds used in these studies were typically well above the deposit insurance limits (first applicable in 1934), and as a result the data yield information on very large accounts for which deposit insurance is a very limited factor. Table 4 lists a limited number of statistics from these studies. The first line in Table 4 is from May 1933, and records the concentration of deposits in accounts over $50,000-well above the $2,500 insurance limit that went into effect in January 1934 and the $5,000 limit in place from late 1934 until 1950.
Deposits were highly concentrated, as only the largest 0.15 percent of accounts was above the $50,000 threshold, and such accounts held 45 percent of all deposits.
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Later observations, from the late 1930s until the early 1950s, record the holdings of accounts above $25,000, which was still several times the deposit insurance limit, but lower than the $50,000 threshold used in the 1933 measurement (especially once inflation is taken into account as shown in the last column of Table 4 ). Even with the lower threshold, only around 0.3 to 0.5 percent of accounts exceeded $25,000, and they generally held about 50 percent of all deposits. The pattern continues to hold in the 1960s and 1970s when a higher threshold of $100,000 was used. The last data date from the early 1980s.
As far as I know, no efforts have been made to collect data of this kind since the 1980s.
However, some additional data have become available since 2008. Unlimited insurance has been available for noninterest-bearing transaction deposits under the TAG program described above, while less than 0.5 percent of household deposits exceeded the same size threshold, and held only 6 percent of all deposits. Altogether, it is clear that the concentration of deposits is a feature that is robust to the exclusion of non-household and non-business deposits, and that business deposits by themselves can account for large amounts of observed concentration.
The role of large depositors from 1929-1933
Large depositors were a key force behind bank withdrawals during the 1929-1933 period.
This fact is most convincingly established by Krost (1938) , lead author of a Federal Reserve
Board study that examined the withdrawal records of depositors at a sample of 67 banks that suspended between 1930 and 1933. The Krost study does not describe deposit runs per se but rather the outflow of funds during the several months before bank suspensions. Deposit outflows in these data are substantial, averaging 37 percent.
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commercial banks and other depository institutions, (5) banks in foreign countries, and (6) foreign governments and official institutions. The first category is very broad as it lumps together households and businesses. Even for this broad group there is no separate information on the insurance coverage. Quarterly reports for thrift institutions in 2008 did not break down deposits in this fashion at all. More data are available from the mid 1930s. In December 1936, 34.2 percent of demand deposits were owed to nonfinancial businesses, 21.6 percent to nonbank financial businesses, 16.8 percent to public bodies, leaving only 27.3 percent that were owed to individuals, non-profit organizations, and other unclassified entities such as unincorporated businesses.31 The share held by the latter group (including individuals) in December 1933, which is likely somewhat skewed given the great exodus of deposits during the preceding two years, was still only 25.7 percent. 31 In terms of the sample used by Krost, it is described as "representative of suspensions [in the early 1930s] involving banks with total deposits of between $1,000,000 and $25,000,000, located in urban areas" (p. 4). It is a 5% sample of such banks, by amount of deposits. Under-represented therefore are smaller banks in agricultural areas. Nevertheless, the focus on larger banks is actually beneficial for the purposes of making a connection with modern experience, as such banks held a disproportionately large share of deposits, and also because of the general increase in average bank size since the 1930s given consolidation.
The Krost study found that 48 percent of deposits in these banks were held in accounts larger than $5,000, which was the insurance limit from 1934 to 1950, similar to the figures found in sector-wide studies summarized before in Table 5 . Large deposits take on additional importance in the Krost study, though, because withdrawal rates were higher for the large accounts. As a result, large accounts were responsible for a disproportionate amount of the outflows. For example, demand deposit accounts in excess of $5,000 were responsible for 67 percent of demand deposit outflows (see Table 5 ). Accounts in excess of $25,000 alone were responsible for 43 percent of the outflow, despite holding only 28 percent of the deposits. This disproportionately arises from higher withdrawal rates, such as a 58 percent withdrawal rate from accounts larger than $25,000, compared to a 28 percent withdrawal rate for accounts less than $5,000. 32 These facts remain true for business accounts examined separately, and for household accounts examined separately.
The disproportionality is somewhat surprising but ultimately reveals important characteristics of large depositors and "old-fashioned" deposit runs. Conceptions of oldfashioned deposit runs typically highlight images of small depositors forming long lines to withdraw money from banks en masse. Those depositors are "visible" or perhaps "noisy." 33 This leads to a distinction with modern runs, which are conceived of as more "invisible" or "silent" by the fact that in-person withdrawals are not as necessary today, given ATMs and online banking.
However, large depositors in the 1930s were not constrained by the need to stand in line.
Withdrawals in the 1930s were more invisible than the famous black and white pictures of depositor hordes would suggest. Large depositors were more likely to hold checking accounts (e.g. business payroll accounts) rather than savings accounts, and therefore could write checks to other banks and withdraw money without standing in line. Large depositors were also more likely to hold multiple bank accounts, giving them an alternative location to safely park funds if withdrawn from a particular bank. Likewise, large depositors were more likely to be willing to hold other forms of wealth, such as securities. Smaller depositors, in contrast, being less likely to have other bank accounts and less accustomed to forms of wealth besides bank deposits, were the 32 This Krost study was seemingly once quite influential among Federal Reserve Board staff, and cited at various points in the following years. Today is not very well known, probably partly because it was never published widely (though it can now be downloaded from the St Louis Federal Reserve's FRASER website). 33 Between 1938 and 2008, somehow the phrase "invisible run" was abandoned in favor of "silent run." That latter phrase was used frequently to describe the runs by large depositors at institutions such as Wachovia and Washington Mutual, but visibility seems to be the key attribute rather than noisiness, if we take this metaphor perhaps too seriously.
ones who were forced to stand in line, but as we have seen, their deposits were in fact more stable than deposits held by larger depositors and therefore should not be overemphasized.
Altogether, Krost challenges the conventional wisdom that apparently had already crystallized at the time of his writing in 1938:
The long lines of depositors waiting at tellers' windows were the most spectacular visible fact connected with the bank suspensions of the depression, and the dramatic character of such scenes has perhaps led to a general impression that many bank suspensions were attributable to visible runs of this type. This impression is not borne out by the figures in the following pages showing that the bulk of deposit losses occurred in accounts of depositors who were able to create invisible runs. annual report that "Large depositors with wide connections transferred accounts from bank to bank and from city to city" although it offers no direct evidence for that statement (p. 6).
Scattered reports from elsewhere in the country tell similar stories of withdrawals from large corporate accounts. At the Bank of United States, the failure of which is famous for initiating one of the first phases of Depression-era bank instability in December 1930, withdrawals in "commercial accounts" were described as heavier than deposits in "thrift" accounts, and the city of New York alone held $1.5 million in the Bank of United States. 36 A less well known bank crisis in Toledo, Ohio during 1931 also featured central roles for large depositors, who withdrew vast amounts of money according to Messer-Kruse (2004, pp. 67-85) .
The troubles in Toledo started at one bank, the Security-Home Bank. Messer-Kruse notes that 34 It is not clear that this withdrawal should be excluded from consideration, since such delinking even among affiliates is a destabilizing feature of periods of financial stress. When asked, Clifford Longley, the Union Guardian president, stated during the Pecora hearings that "they just withdrew it to cut down on their deposit in the [Union Guardian] Trust Co., and whether because they needed the money I don't know" (United States Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 1934, p. 4542) . It seems likely that the withdrawals was a move for liquidity by the other bank's management that may not have been well coordinated at the banking group level. 35 This is a gross withdrawal figure. There were a moderate amount of inflows, so that overall non-trust deposits were down 9.6% over the 42 days. Witnesses testifying before Congress in the 1930s-as the deposit insurance legislation was being debated-noted the importance of large depositors, on several occasions. The Texas Banking Commissioner told Congress that "it is the ten-and twenty-thousand-dollar depositor who closes the small bank out in the country, and the others follow him" and that in his state "The large automobile concerns and large depositors are withdrawing one hundred and two hundred thousand dollars at a time" (United States Congress 1934, p. 125) . Senator Gore asserted at one point that small depositors were the cause of bank runs, only to be contradicted by the witness, the president of the giant Chemical Bank, who said such claims were "not true:"
The smart fellow gets out first, and he is the big depositor. What we call the national money, the big chain stores and tobacco companies and that type of people, they get out first, long before the little fellow ever hears of it… You see the [small depositor] walk in the door to get his money. You do not see the large depositor that checks his out that goes through the clearing house. (US Congress 1932, p. 166) .
Similarly, a banker and former Representative told Congress that "Your big trouble is in the big withdrawals that come in through the exchanges, rather than the small withdrawals... The bank holidays in many states were forced largely by large deposits that were drawn through the exchanges and not the withdrawal of small deposits at the window" (United States Congress 1935, p. 817). Preston (1935) noted that "Large deposits are maintained by firms... Until recently it was assumed that they were much less subject to alarm than the mass of depositors. In the banking crisis in March the withdrawals and transfers by corporation treasurers was a leading cause of embarrassment to banks" (p. 599).
The design of deposit insurance
There is a large literature describing the origins of federal deposit insurance in the United
States. For the purposes of this paper, what is relevant is how large depositors were thought of by those who designed the FDIC.
Since the inception of the FDIC, incomplete coverage of large depositors has been motivated by the desire to preserve some market discipline by those depositors (Flood 1961, pp. 61-62) . Large depositors were seen as being able to exercise such discipline because they had access to more and better information regarding bank condition in comparison to small depositors. For example, the first head of the FDIC, Leo Crowley, stated in testimony to
Congress that "A person that has $25,000 to invest is quite able to analyze the bank situation and to take care of himself" (United States Congress 1950, pp. 12-13 ; note that $25,000 was five times the insurance limit being debated at the time). 37 Likewise, Preston (1935) noted that "Large deposits are maintained by firms which are frequently heavy borrowers. It is these depositors who are able to exercise the right of offset in the case of bank failure; they are better able to get the facts concerning their bank's condition" (p. 599). 38 In contrast, small depositors were viewed as unable to adequately monitor their banks. Jacob Viner noted that "The common run of small depositors has neither the information necessary to appraise the status of a bank nor the competence to interpret the information if it was available to him" (1936, p. 110) .
The desire for market discipline by large depositors has always been at tension with financial stability. I am by no means the first to note that deposit runs are still possible given the Jones (1938, p. 701) and Fox (1936, p. 107) .
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These longstanding fears, that deposit insurance would become unlimited at the height of a crisis, were realized in a way during 2008 when the FDIC created a program to fully insure noninterestbearing transaction accounts. 
Conclusion
An open question is whether large depositors would help create deposit runs in the event of another financial crisis at US depository institutions. Large depositors, by virtue of being uninsured and owning substantial amounts of deposits, have long represented a source of potential market discipline on depository institutions, but also a potential contributor to financial instability. In 2008, this tension was temporarily resolved in favor of reducing financial 39 Jones wrote "In light of past experience the Government will probably not in the future permit failure of the very large banks-the banks which hold the bulk of the uninsured deposits. If this is true, the depositors in these banks have what is in effect 100 per cent insurance at the present time." Fox wrote "If the corporation is to maintain confidence during times of depression and thus remove the necessity for cumulative liquidation, it may be necessary that large as well as small depositors be protected." 40 In this vein, Silber (2009) posits that the March, 1933 banking holiday was successful because of de facto 100 percent insurance for deposits at banks that re-opened after the holiday. This argument centers on the Emergency Banking Act of 1933, which did not insure deposits but did grant the Federal Reserve the ability to issue emergency currency, a change that Silber suggests was taken implicitly as a means to provide banks with whatever currency would be needed to meet depositor demands. The thesis is interesting, and if compelling then those events would parallel closely the creation of unlimited transaction deposit insurance put in place by the FDIC in 2008. The fact that Silber proposes the thesis reflects continued puzzlement over how the banking panic restored confidence among bank depositors. The evidence provided by Silber-that cash was redeposited after the holiday, and that stock prices increased-strongly indicate a return of confidence, but more evidence is needed to show that the de facto 100 percent insurance was the mechanism underlying the return of confidence.
instability, as the FDIC responded by implementing the Transaction Account Guarantee program which gave unlimited insurance to large transaction deposit accounts. The Dodd-Frank Act temporarily extended that unlimited insurance until the end of 2012. Under current law, the FDIC no longer has the authority to create such a program on its own. However, the FDIC has broad powers under its new Orderly Liquidation Authority to be used in the case of an insolvent and systemically important firm. The practical implementation of this authority is unclear at this point, but it will have paramount relevance for how large depositors view the safety of their holdings and their incentive to run.
The deposit runs at banks in 2008 help mark the end of a "quiet period" in US banking, as described by Gorton and Metrick (2012) . In looking back on the long period of stability in the banking sector that began in the mid 1930s, this paper suggests that other factors besides deposit insurance may deserve more attention. Some reforms to the commercial banking system during 35-42, by bank officials during the second and third quarter earnings teleconferences (http://bit.ly/LnR900 and http://bit.ly/LnRcZz), and in Moody's (2008) . Daily data on core deposits are charted in National City's 2008Q3 earnings presentation (available from the author) and so the deposit figures listed here are estimates from that chart. This is the only data that refer to the subset core deposits rather than all deposits in this table. -The Sovereign events are described in a 12/16/2008 F-4/A filing with the SEC (http://1.usa.gov/MeGLZ8), pp.
40-42, and in its third quarter earnings release (available from the author). -The IndyMac event is described on p. 3 of its Material Loss Review (http://1.usa.gov/gnuLAi). The data are annual year-end and taken from the FDIC annual reports, relating to domestic deposits only. Foreign deposits are all uninsured and not included in the denominator. Up to 2005, the bank insurance fund data are available separately, but after 2005 the bank and savings association insurance funds are only available combined. The year-end 2008 figure is lower than it should be, as the increase in coverage to $250,000 was temporary at first, but the data were still collected on the basis of the permanent $100,000 limit. The higher coverage was made permanent after 2008 and so the 2009-2011 figures do not suffer from this problem. This is a replication and extension of a similar chart in White (1998). 
